Why Congress will not represent (thus, will not reflect) the will of the people with the best-drawn district maps so long as the House is its current size and selected from single-member districts.
The new 118th Congress will be sworn in on January 3 with new faces from new places thanks, in part, to reapportionment and redistricting done following the 2020 Census and in advance of the 2022 elections.
An online search for “2022 elections effect of redistricting”
yielded articles from most every news organization that covers US politics in a
serious way. Perhaps the most accurate conclusion about the influence of this
decade’s redistricting as was drawn by Nathaniel Rakich and Elena Mejia of fivethirtyeight.com:
“…the 2021-22 redistricting cycle didn’t radically change
the partisanship of the national House map, so I mostly agree with those who
say redistricting didn’t cost Democrats the House. But at the same time, those
who say Republicans won only because they gerrymandered are also technically
correct.”
Put another way, to the extent the 2021-22 House map somewhat
favors Republicans is a residue of the Republican skew of the maps drawn a
decade ago.
Then what is there to do about it? The same fivethirtyeight.com
article says:
“The reality is, it’s impossible to say whether Democrats
would have won the House in a world where no state was gerrymandered. The
definition of a ‘fair map’ is subjective,…”
Dave Wasserman of Cook Political Report says the lack
of a national standard stands in the way of districts being drawn in
non-partisan ways.
But there’s more to it than that.
The whole paradigm of American Congressional Districting is flawed.
First, a reasonable definition of a fair map is a map that makes
it likely for elections to result in the partisan makeup of a state’s representatives
to reflect the partisan makeup of that state’s electorate.
Second, let’s consider some structural barriers. The average Congressional District encompasses 760,000 people, contiguous, and (supposedly) geographically compact. They’re all single-member districts. More than four-fifths of Congressional Districts are decided by plurality; get one vote more than anyone else, and you win the seat. Also, about four-fifths of seats are “safe;” one party has a big enough advantage that the winner of that party’s primary almost always will win the seat. And even though certain regions of the country and certain regions of each state are thought of as “blue” or “red,” they’re really all varying shades of purple. As a result, it’s almost impossible to draw truly representative (fair?) maps in many states.
Let’s consider Massachusetts. About one-third of the commonwealth
votes Republican. They have 9 Congressional Districts. A truly representative map
would provide for 3 districts winnable by Republicans, but all 9 districts
there are safe for the Democrats. That’s because the cities are so blue, there’s
not a high-enough contiguous concentration of Republicans anywhere in the state
to draw a compact Republican district. In fact, in order to divide Massachusetts
such that even 2 districts give a chance to Republicans (not an edge, but a
chance), you’d have to subdivide the commonwealth something like the following:
Hypothetical
Congressional District Map of Massachusetts having two possible Republican seats
(Note: all hypothetical maps drawn in districtbuilder.org)
The possible Republican seats would be MA-1 (green; central
area) and MA-5 (light blue; south/south-central). Democrats still have a slight
advantage in both those districts, but the advantage is surmountable in each. In
order to make this possible, MA-2 has to be drawn to carve almost all of Springfield
and Worcestor out of MA-1 PLUS MA-3 has to be drawn to carve Fall River and New
Bedford out of the center of MA-5.
Even 19th Century Massachusetts Governor and U.S.
Vice President Elbridge Gerry, the namesake of the term Gerrymander, might well
look at this map and say “That’s messed up.”
A red state that’s in a similar circumstance: Oklahoma. About
30% of the state votes Democratic. In a state with 5 Congressional Districts…
one safe Democratic seat would seem fair. It’s plausible, but….:
Hypothetical
Congressional District Map of Oklahoma having one safe Democratic seat
The safe Democratic seat would be OK-1 (the green sliver in
the center). In order to get a contiguous district of 790,000 people (1/5 of
Oklahoma’s population) with enough Democrats to be safe, you must connect most
of Norman to the most-Democratic parts of Oklahoma City and some of Edmond,
then connect all of that to most-Democratic half of Tulsa.
Note: OK-4 (the brown district, generally flanking OK-1 to
its south) need not be the non-compact shape I drew it in the tool I used. Both
OK-4 and OK-5 (to its south) are very-safe Republican; population could be interchanged
between the two with no political consequence. It was just easier for me to consume
the fractional counties if I kept them in the same district.
One might think enlarging Congress to yield smaller, more-heterogeneous
districts would resolve this. As a practical matter, it might make a dent in the problem, but not solve it. Suppose you increased the
size of Congress fivefold (to in excess of 2000 members) to where Oklahoma
would have 25 seats and Massachusetts 45. So long as they had to be compact,
single-member districts, an Oklahoma map likely would give you no more than 1
safe and 2 winnable seats for Democrats (at most, 3 total, 12% of seats for 30%
of the voters), and a Massachusetts map still might not yield any safe Republican
seats, but about 8 of 45 districts would be winnable by the GOP (at most 17.8% of
the seats for 33% of the voters).
Ultimately, you can apply any number changes to the
redistricting process and they still won’t yield representative districts unless
the districting paradigm itself allows for a representative result to exist.
The paradigm of single-member districts whose winners are chosen by plurality is
not a such a paradigm. Fortunately, a different paradigm exists.
The US House should be bigger & selected from Multi-Member Districts via Ranked-Choice Voting
The current size of the US House is the same as it was when
the country was one-fourth of its current population. For more than a century, Congress
normally increased the size of the House after the census every decade, but
they couldn’t reach an agreement about the size of the House after the 1920 census
and reapportionment did not occur that decade. According to Dan Bouk of Colgate
University, the 1920’s debate wasn’t, as myth might have it, about limitations
of the physical size of the House chamber itself. Bouk says the debate hinged
on the insistence of a set of leaders that the House could no longer grow and continue
to be an efficient, deliberative body. Those leaders didn’t want to pay for
more Congressional salaries, office space, and staffers.
Not wanting a repeat of what happened after the 1920 Census,
Congress passed the Permanent Reapportion Act of 1929, and it stands as the law
by which we have 435 House seats and how they’re apportioned after each census.
As a result, “The People’s House” now has but one representative from Delaware,
a state with a population exceeding 1,000,000. If nothing is done by 2030, odds
are, Rhode Island and its 1.1 million residents only will have a single
at-large House seat.
Instead of apportioning a fixed number of House seats upon a
variable population, I recommend fixing the ratio of House seats per person to
no fewer than one per 330,000, serving in Multi-Member Congressional Districts
as follows.
· States having the following number of House seats shall contain ONLY 5-member districts with only enough 6-member districts to incorporate all House seats: 10, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 20 or more.
· States having the following number of House seats shall contain ONLY 5-member districts plus one 4-member district: 9, 14, and 19.
· States having 13 representatives shall contain two 4-member districts and one 5-member district.
· States with 8 representatives shall contain two 4-member districts.
· States with 7 representatives shall contain one 4-member and one 3-member district.
· States with 6 or fewer representatives shall contain a single multi-member district.
House members should be elected from these multi-member
districts via Proportional
Ranked Choice Voting (PRCV).
FAQ
Why is expanding the House important? And why to a fixed population ratio of 330,000 per seat?
First, there’s the idea of the House being “The People’s
House.” Among G20 democracies, the median ratio of seats in the lower legislative
chamber to population is about one per 175,000, so one per 330,000 is more-closely
in alignment with the rest of the world.
If the size of the House were to be increased as I described, each MMCD (or state with a single MMCD), therefore, each American,
would have more than one Representative. Given the districting rules above, 98%
of Americans would have 4 or more Representatives and almost 93% would have 5
or more. For the fullest benefits of MMCD to take hold (see below), most of the
US would need to be in districts of 5 or more members. Today, 21 states don’t even
have five House members, only 13 have states ten or more (for the purpose of
having at least two 5-member MMCD). Plus, a 5-member MMCD with the US House remaining its current size would be a huge jurisdiction
of 3.8-million (almost the median jurisdiction of a US Senator).
Also, only states having a shrinking population would be exposed
to losing Representatives each decade, so redistricting rarely could be used to
compel two incumbents to run directly against each other.
What is so important about most MMCD having 5 or more members?
Such districts would serve the following purposes:
to ensure fuller and more-balanced representation of the electorate in each MMCD,
to make it harder (as compared to drawing smaller MMCD) for manipulative redistricting to cause election results in the individual districts in a state to be materially different from a hypothetical predicted statewide result,
to foster competition and to prevent the partisan lean of a district from insulating an incumbent House member of the district’s majority party from accountability and to offer a reasonable opportunity for political diversity -- for third-party candidates, independents, and moderate major-party candidates to win seats.
Fuller Representation
In single-member districts decided by plurality, any vote above
and beyond the vote that gets the winning candidate their plurality gets underrepresented.
Additional votes that went to the winning candidates are surplus votes. Any votes
that went to other candidates would be unrepresented. Surplus votes plus
unrepresented votes always would be at least “50% -1” votes in a district (even
more if there’s a third candidate in the race).
In a multi-member district chosen by PRCV… any surplus votes
for the leading vote getters are transferred, proportionally, according to how each
voter’s 2nd, 3rd, etc. choices. The maximum number of
underrepresented votes in a MMCD using PRCV would be:
· 2 members: 33 1/3% - 1
· 3 members: 25% - 1
· 4 members: 20% - 1
· 5 members: 16 2/3% - 1
· 6 members: 14 2/7% - 1
So, instead of 50% + 1 or fewer voters deciding each House
seat, it’s 80% or more in 5+-member MMCD.
More Balanced Representation
To the extent Americans would be in 5-member MMCD (and many
6-member districts, as well), almost every district in the country (95%+) would
be represented by at least one Democrat and at least one Republican.
In a 5-member district chosen by PRCV, a candidate only
needs 16 2/3% + 1 vote (either first-choice votes or proportionally transferred
votes) to win a seat. At a size of 330,000 per House seat, a 5-member MMCD
would be around 1.65-million people. There is very little real estate in the US
that’s contiguous, within the same state, and contains 1.65-million people that
does NOT have a recent voting pattern of at least 17% Democratic and at least
17% Republican votes. Thus, almost all Americans who have a party preference
would find themselves having at least one of their 5 House members coming from their
own party – someone who largely shares their views and to whom they would be
comfortable raising concerns that might be addressed by Congress.
Minimizing the Impact of Manipulative Redistricting
This is best illustrated by example.
Let’s go back to Oklahoma. As a state, its 2022 Cook PVI
rating is R+20. This means the electorate in Oklahoma leans 20 points more Republican
than the average US electorate. The 2022 PVI rating defines the average US
electorate being a weighted reflection of ratio of Democratic vs Republican votes
in the past 2 Presidential elections, D+0.0/R+0.0 in 2022 is almost exactly 52D / 48R. A 2022 PVI rating of R+2 is the 50/50 point. So Oklahoma, as R+20, favors
Republicans about 68/32 (48R + 20 = 68R) … with Republicans expected to receive
between 64.7%-71.3% of the statewide vote. If you gave Oklahoma one House seat
per 330,000, The Sooner State would have 12 Representatives. If the state,
hypothetically, were to select all 12 members at large through PRCV in an
election containing only Republicans or Democrats on the ballot, Republicans
would win 8 or 9 House seats (with Democrats getting 4 or 3, respectively). Expressed
differently – Oklahoma At Large would be a 3/8/1 MMCD (3 safe D, 8 safe R, 1 tossup)
Now, let’s divide Oklahoma into two 6-member MMCD. Let's have one district link Muskogee, Tulsa, Oklahoma City, and Norman into an R+10 district, leaving
the rest of the state as an R+29 district.
If you look at the table of Predicted
Partisan Composition of Multi-Member Congressional Districts table below,
you’d see the following mixture:
· D1 (green 6-member R+10): 2/3/1/0/0
· D2 (tan 6 member R+29): 1/5/0/0/0
Split this way, Oklahoma, in the aggregate, would have a
predicted 3/8/1 election result – exactly the predicted result if its voters
selected 12 members at large.
Now let’s cut each of these two districts into two 3-member MMCD,
each with as close to the same PVI ratings as the 6-member districts from which
they were created.
If you look at the table of Predicted Partisan Compositionof Multi-Member Congressional Districts table below, you’d see the following
mixture:
· D1 (green 3-member R+10): 1/2/0/0/0
· D2 (tan 3 member R+11): 1/2/0/0/0
· D3 (purple 3-member R+29): 0/2/1/0/1
· D4 (brown 3 member R+29): 0/2/1/0/1
Split into 3-member districts, Oklahoma, in the aggregate, would have a
predicted 2/8/2 election result. Because both tossups lean Republican (almost
likely Republican, a PVI of R+30 would be 0/3/0/0/0), the most-likely final electoral
result would be 2/10 – one fewer D seat than is plausible in the predicted statewide
at-large result of 3/8/1.
The difference exists because the predicted result of two
separate 3-member MMCD each having a given PVI does not usually equal the
result for the combined 6-member district having the same PVI. In fact, in the
chart below, it’s only equal for the following PVI ranges: R+20 to R+13
(2/4/0/0/0), and D+9 to D+16 (4/2/0/0/0) … these are ranges where (a) either
Republicans have between 61-68% of the vote… or Democrats have 61-68% of the
vote (i.e. where it’s reasonable to expect the majority parties to win 2/3 of the
seats).
Because the sum of 5+member districts vote totals comes really
close to the predicted statewide at large result, there’s little reason to
spend the time and effort drawing lots of crooked district lines to yield a
specific partisan mix, because making Party X safer in District A makes the
same party more vulnerable in District B.
Competition, Accountability, and Diversity
Competition takes several forms. The most obvious is the
extent to which Tossup seats exist. As the states’ district lines are drawn
right now, 20% of House seats are competitive (having PVI between D+5 and R+5).
Now look at the Predicted Partisan Composition of Multi-MemberCongressional Districts table for 5-member and 6-member districts. While the chart has values for R+32 to D+39, very few districts will come to exist having PVI within 5 points of the most-extreme values at either end of the spectrum. Of the 63 PVI values between R+27 and D+34, 27 values (43%) for 5-member districts yield a district having a competitive seat. In that same range, 29 of 63 PVI values (48%) for 6-member districts yield a district having a competitive seat. Even if some districts are drawn expressly just to have PVI values just outside of those competitive PVI values, political geography will force the line-drawers to make some competitive districts. And in some states, the authorities in charge of redistricting may be compelled to draw competitive districts, either by law or due to a belief that their party can outgun the opposition in Tossup races.
If the redistricting rules were to compel states to redistrict in
a non-partisan way, having 40%+ of all 199 MMCD nationwide contain at least one
Tossup seat certainly is realistic. Even if states use their own methods to
draw district lines, even a meager average of one competitive MMCD in each state
with between 7 and 25 Representatives (23 states) plus two competitive MMCD in
each state with 26 representatives or more (12 states) would mean 24% of MMCD
would have a Tossup seat.
Another form of competition is best expressed by example.
Let’s consider D2 from the Oklahoma map having two 6-member
districts. R+29. Predicted result 1D, 5R. Suppose the incumbents are 1 D and 5
R and they all want to be re-elected.
How many Democrats do you think would be on the General Election
ballot in this 6-seat district? How many Republicans?
One approach each party might take: stand up only the six incumbents.
They each win a seat and everyone goes back to Washington for 2 years.
But suppose the Democrats get to thinking: “Wait a minute… one
of those 5 Republican incumbents is politically vulnerable in some way: inept, corrupt,
whatever… and there's another Democrat in the district
who shares some of the views of our party, but appeals to independents and some
Republicans, too. Let’s go after the vulnerable
Republican and take him out and grab this winnable seat.” Voila! A second Democrat on the ballot.
Now maybe the Republicans are thinking the same thing about
the Democrat incumbent. Or maybe the Republicans think they don’t want to lose one
of “their seats” to a Democrat because one of their incumbents isn’t up to par.
In any case, they stand up-a 6th Republican in the General.
And it’s everybody for oneself. Even if those are the only
candidates on the ballot, the upstart Democrat may no do well, he may unseat the
perceived-weak Republican, he may unseat the incumbent Democrat if the party’s
voters prefer to the upstart to the incumbent. As for the 6th
Republican in the field; he also could falter, he might dump the lone D in the
district, or one of his own party-mates.
Ultimately, this helps ensure that each incumbent is exposed to being held accountable at the ballot box for their performance in office due to competition from members of their own party.
Now add another wrinkle.
In a 6-seat district, 14.3% of the vote gets a seat. In 2022,
a handful of Republicans in very safe districts didn’t have a Democratic opponent
in the General Election but DID have a Libertarian opponent. In a lot of those
cases, the Libertarian got 12-15% of the vote. Maybe the Libertarian party thinks
“If we get serious in this district, we actually can win one of these seats for
once.” So a Libertarian enters the mix.
Furthermore, some unaffiliated person in the district who may
or may not have some local notoriety may think “There’s a lot of independents
in this district. I don’t like any of the incumbents or party-affiliated
candidates. Too Beltway, not enough Cowboy. I’m in as an Indy.”
So now there are 10 viable candidates and 6 slots. No incumbent
is safe. There’s no guarantee of the party mix; it might go 2D / 4R, it might
go 1D / 3R / 1L / 1I. Who knows?
And across the country in a 5D / 1R district in metro Los
Angeles… the major parties are thinking the same thing… as is a Green Party hopeful
and an immigrants’ rights activist who’s tired of each party’s lack of action
on regularizing Dreamers. Now THAT district has 10 candidates on the ballot for
6 slots.
In many 5- and 6-member districts, Independents would control enough votes to elect 2 seats with no help from Democrats nor Republicans. Anyone on the ballot, whether affiliated with a party or not, would need to respect that. Broadly, it will force politicians of all stripes to consider the voter at the margin.
Other Effects of Selecting House Members in MMCD using PRCV
The Electoral College – as a practical matter, it would not change the outsized influence of small states very much. In a congress of 1001 members, which would be its size in a 1 per 330,000 person ratio. Wyoming would have 0.36% of ECV instead of 0.56%. California would have 11.05% instead of 10.04%. And given which states are Red, Blue and Swing, it won’t radically change the requirements for getting elected President.
Suppose the electoral
map in 2024 had 1104 EV (1001 House Seats + 100 Senate Seats + 3 for DC) versus
538 (current map). Suppose Biden or the Democratic nominee wins the same states
as 2020 except Georgia, Arizona and New Hampshire. Further suppose in the 1104
EV map, Maine would have 6 EV with a single MMCD having 2D and 2R. Nebraska
would have 8 EV with a single MMCD having 2D and 4R. In the 538 EV map, the Republican
would win 271-267 (Maine EV going 3D-1R as in 2020 and Nebraska EV going 1D-4R as
in 2020). In the 1104 EV map, the Democrat would win 553-551 (Maine EV going 4D-2R and Nebraska EV going 2D-6R).
The states, having had to adopt a form of Ranked Choice
Voting for the US House, would easily be able to and have no barrier to adopt RCV
for a multitude of races on the ballot… even single-winner races because of the
instant runoff nature of RCV.
Conclusion
The size of the US House of Representatives is not enshrined in the Constitution, nor is the notion of single-member districts nor winner-take-all.
Predicted Partisan Composition of Multi-Member Congressional Districts (by size and 2022 Cook PVI)
Republican-Leaning Districts
District compositions predicted to have competitive races are in bold
|
|
District Members (Safe D/Safe R/Tossup/D-LeanTossup*/R-LeanTossup*) |
|||
|
PVI-2022 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
|
R+32 |
0/3/0/0/0 |
0/3/1/0/0 |
1/4/0/0/0 |
1/5/0/0/0 |
|
R+31 |
0/3/0/0/0 |
0/3/1/0/0 |
1/4/0/0/0 |
1/5/0/0/0 |
|
R+30 |
0/3/0/0/0 |
0/3/1/1/0 |
1/4/0/0/0 |
1/5/0/0/0 |
|
R+29 |
0/2/1/0/1 |
1/3/0/0/0 |
1/4/0/0/0 |
1/5/0/0/0 |
|
R+28 |
0/2/1/0/0 |
1/3/0/0/0 |
1/4/0/0/0 |
1/5/0/0/0 |
|
R+27 |
0/2/1/0/0 |
1/3/0/0/0 |
1/4/0/0/0 |
1/5/0/0/0 |
|
R+26 |
0/2/1/0/0 |
1/3/0/0/0 |
1/4/0/0/0 |
1/4/1/0/1 |
|
R+25 |
0/2/1/1/0 |
1/3/0/0/0 |
1/4/0/0/0 |
1/4/1/0/1 |
|
R+24 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/3/0/0/0 |
1/4/0/0/0 |
1/4/1/0/0 |
|
R+23 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/3/0/0/0 |
1/4/0/0/0 |
1/4/1/0/0 |
|
R+22 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/3/0/0/0 |
1/4/0/0/0 |
1/4/1/1/0 |
|
R+21 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/3/0/0/0 |
1/3/1/0/1 |
1/4/1/1/0 |
|
R+20 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/3/0/0/0 |
1/3/1/0/0 |
2/4/0/0/0 |
|
R+19 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/3/0/0/0 |
1/3/1/0/0 |
2/4/0/0/0 |
|
R+18 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/3/0/0/0 |
1/3/1/0/0 |
2/4/0/0/0 |
|
R+17 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/3/0/0/0 |
1/3/1/1/0 |
2/4/0/0/0 |
|
R+16 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/3/0/0/0 |
1/3/1/1/0 |
2/4/0/0/0 |
|
R+15 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/2/1/0/1 |
2/3/0/0/0 |
2/4/0/0/0 |
|
R+14 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/2/1/0/1 |
2/3/0/0/0 |
2/4/0/0/0 |
|
R+13 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/2/1/0/0 |
2/3/0/0/0 |
2/4/0/0/0 |
|
R+12 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/2/1/0/0 |
2/3/0/0/0 |
2/3/1/0/1 |
|
R+11 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/2/1/0/0 |
2/3/0/0/0 |
2/3/1/0/1 |
|
R+10 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/2/1/1/0 |
2/3/0/0/0 |
2/3/1/0/0 |
|
R+9 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
1/2/1/1/0 |
2/3/0/0/0 |
2/3/1/0/0 |
|
R+8 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
2/2/0/0/0 |
2/3/0/0/0 |
2/3/1/0/0 |
|
R+7 |
1/2/0/0/0 |
2/2/0/0/0 |
2/3/0/0/0 |
2/3/1/1/0 |
|
R+6 |
1/1/1/0/1 |
2/2/0/0/0 |
2/2/1/0/1 |
2/3/1/1/0 |
|
R+5 |
1/1/1/0/1 |
2/2/0/0/0 |
2/2/1/0/1 |
3/3/0/0/0 |
|
R+4 |
1/1/1/0/1 |
2/2/0/0/0 |
2/2/1/0/1 |
3/3/0/0/0 |
|
R+3 |
1/1/1/0/0 |
2/2/0/0/0 |
2/2/1/0/0 |
3/3/0/0/0 |
|
R+2 |
1/1/1/0/0 |
2/2/0/0/0 |
2/2/1/0/0 |
3/3/0/0/0 |
|
R+1 |
1/1/1/0/0 |
2/2/0/0/0 |
2/2/1/0/0 |
3/3/0/0/0 |
|
R+0 |
1/1/1/1/0 |
2/2/0/0/0 |
2/2/1/1/0 |
3/3/0/0/0 |
Democratic-Leaning Districts
|
|
District Members (Safe D/Safe R/Tossup/D-LeanTossup*/R-LeanTossup*) |
|||
|
PVI-2022 |
3 |
4 |
5 |
6 |
|
D+0 |
1/1/1/1/0 |
2/2/0/0/0 |
2/2/1/1/0 |
3/3/0/0/0 |
|
D+1 |
1/1/1/1/0 |
2/2/0/0/0 |
2/2/1/1/0 |
3/3/0/0/0 |
|
D+2 |
1/1/1/1/0 |
2/2/0/0/0 |
2/2/1/1/0 |
3/2/1/0/1 |
|
D+3 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
2/2/0/0/0 |
3/2/0/0/0 |
3/2/1/0/1 |
|
D+4 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
2/2/0/0/0 |
3/2/0/0/0 |
3/2/1/0/0 |
|
D+5 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
2/1/1/0/1 |
3/2/0/0/0 |
3/2/1/0/0 |
|
D+6 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
2/1/1/0/1 |
3/2/0/0/0 |
3/2/1/0/0 |
|
D+7 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
2/1/1/0/0 |
3/2/0/0/0 |
3/2/1/1/0 |
|
D+8 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
2/1/1/0/0 |
3/2/0/0/0 |
3/2/1/1/0 |
|
D+9 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
2/1/1/0/0 |
3/2/0/0/0 |
4/2/0/0/0 |
|
D+10 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
2/1/1/1/0 |
3/2/0/0/0 |
4/2/0/0/0 |
|
D+11 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
2/1/1/1/0 |
3/2/0/0/0 |
4/2/0/0/0 |
|
D+12 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
3/1/0/0/0 |
3/1/1/0/1 |
4/2/0/0/0 |
|
D+13 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
3/1/0/0/0 |
3/1/1/0/1 |
4/2/0/0/0 |
|
D+14 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
3/1/0/0/0 |
3/1/1/0/0 |
4/2/0/0/0 |
|
D+15 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
3/1/0/0/0 |
3/1/1/0/0 |
4/2/0/0/0 |
|
D+16 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
3/1/0/0/0 |
3/1/1/0/0 |
4/2/0/0/0 |
|
D+17 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
3/1/0/0/0 |
3/1/1/1/0 |
4/1/1/0/1 |
|
D+18 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
3/1/0/0/0 |
4/1/0/0/0 |
4/1/1/0/1 |
|
D+19 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
3/1/0/0/0 |
4/1/0/0/0 |
4/1/1/0/0 |
|
D+20 |
2/1/0/0/0 |
3/1/0/0/0 |
4/1/0/0/0 |
4/1/1/0/0 |
|
D+21 |
2/0/1/0/1 |
3/1/0/0/0 |
4/1/0/0/0 |
4/1/1/1/0 |
|
D+22 |
2/0/1/0/0 |
3/1/0/0/0 |
4/1/0/0/0 |
4/1/1/1/0 |
|
D+23 |
2/0/1/0/0 |
3/1/0/0/0 |
4/1/0/0/0 |
5/1/0/0/0 |
|
D+24 |
2/0/1/0/0 |
3/1/0/0/0 |
4/1/0/0/0 |
5/1/0/0/0 |
|
D+25 |
2/0/1/1/0 |
3/1/0/0/0 |
4/1/0/0/0 |
5/1/0/0/0 |
|
D+26 |
3/0/0/0/0 |
3/0/1/0/1 |
4/1/0/0/0 |
5/1/0/0/0 |
|
D+27 |
3/0/0/0/0 |
3/0/1/0/0 |
4/1/0/0/0 |
5/1/0/0/0 |
|
D+28 |
3/0/0/0/0 |
3/0/1/0/0 |
4/1/0/0/0 |
5/1/0/0/0 |
|
D+29 |
3/0/0/0/0 |
3/0/1/0/0 |
4/0/1/0/1 |
5/1/0/0/0 |
|
D+30 |
3/0/0/0/0 |
3/0/1/1/0 |
4/0/1/0/1 |
5/1/0/0/0 |
|
D+31 |
3/0/0/0/0 |
4/0/0/0/0 |
4/0/1/0/0 |
5/1/0/0/0 |
|
D+32 |
3/0/0/0/0 |
4/0/0/0/0 |
4/0/1/0/0 |
5/0/1/0/1 |
|
D+33 |
3/0/0/0/0 |
4/0/0/0/0 |
4/0/1/1/0 |
5/0/1/0/0 |
|
D+34 |
3/0/0/0/0 |
4/0/0/0/0 |
5/0/0/0/0 |
5/0/1/0/0 |
|
D+35 |
3/0/0/0/0 |
4/0/0/0/0 |
5/0/0/0/0 |
5/0/1/1/0 |
|
D+36 |
3/0/0/0/0 |
4/0/0/0/0 |
5/0/0/0/0 |
6/0/0/0/0 |
|
D+37 |
3/0/0/0/0 |
4/0/0/0/0 |
5/0/0/0/0 |
6/0/0/0/0 |
|
D+38 |
3/0/0/0/0 |
4/0/0/0/0 |
5/0/0/0/0 |
6/0/0/0/0 |
|
D+39 |
3/0/0/0/0 |
4/0/0/0/0 |
5/0/0/0/0 |
6/0/0/0/0 |
